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With the same negative structure you don’t know that +PROPOSITION, the
two distinctively different interpretations are possible: type A with the
complement proposition being presupposed as true; type B with the complement
proposition not being presupposed as true (Nakashima 2015a/b). The difference
seems to be closely related to the cognitive interaction of the speaker and the
hearer, who engage in “assessing what the other knows, intends, and is currently
attending to (Langacker 2008: p. 465).” The present paper proposes the hypotheses,
which are based on Langacker’s models of the control cycle (2002, 2009) and the
current discourse space (2008). The examples for each type are examined in light
of the hypotheses: it is shown that the hypotheses are applicable and relevant in
both cases.
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This paper examines the sentence structure you don’t know that +
PROPOSITION with two different meanings. With the verb know, which is one of
the factive predicates, truth of complements is generally presupposed (Kiparsky
and Kiparsky 1970). Thus, in case of factive predicates, even when the main
clauses are negated the subordinate-clause proposition are not (Langacker 2003,
2008, 2009). The phenomenon is shown as in examples in (1) below.
(1)
a. Joe knows that Alice is unhappy.
b. Joe doesn’t know that Alice is unhappy.
In both (1a) and (1b), the complement proposition Alice is unhappy is
presupposed to be true.1 It does not matter whether or not Joe knows the situation
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described in the complement proposition. In either case the speaker could say,
“Alice is unhappy.” When the sentence subject is you , however, there are cases
where the subordinate-clause propositions do not stay as valid if the main clauses
are negated (Nakashima 2015a,b,c). Thus, we propose two types of you don’t
know that +PROPOSITION: type A, in which the factivity is kept intact even when
the main clause is negated; type B, in which the feature of factivity is lost when
the main clause is negated.2 Type A is exemplified in (2); type B in (3) as below.
(2)
TEICHNER: (Voiceover) When the Revolutionary War ended, General George
Washington came home to Mt. Vernon uncomfortable with anything having
to do with slavery. So he hid his new slave quarters in plain sight, next to his
greenhouse.
Mr. WIENCEK: That’s the great genius of Washington the architect. You don’t
know that those are the slave quarters. There are no doors, there are very
small windows. He made it invisible. I mean, this is kind of a symbol of his
struggle with slavery, architecturally, right here in front of us.
(CBS Morning , 2004/02/15)
In example (2) Mr. Wiencek, the speaker of the utterance “you don’t know that
those are the slave quarters,” is saying that George Washington designed the rooms
so that people couldn’t recognize the fact that the rooms were made for slaves.
That is, the subordinate-clause proposition those are the slave quarters is
presupposed to be true. Thus, we regard example (2) as a case of type A, in which
the truth of the complement proposition is presupposed in spite of the main clause
being negated.
On the other hand, (3) is an example of type B, in which the feature of
factivity is lost when the main clause is negated.
(3)
“Look, you don’t know that he took it. You don’t know anybody took it. Maybe it
did fall off. Why don’t you drive back down toward the shop and look for it along
the way?” (Massachusetts Review, Summer 1996)
1 Langacker argues that the feature of factivity will be accounted for by presupposing two
layers of conceptualization: one layer is subjectively construed and the other is objectively
construed (2002, 2009).
2 In Nakashima (2015a/b/c), the two types are analyzed based on the intersubjective view of
Verhagen and his construal configuration (2005, 2007).
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In (3), the speaker of the utterance “you don’t know that he took it” does not
believe the proposition he took it . This is quite obvious because the speaker later
suggests the possibility that the thing might have fallen off accidentally instead of
being stolen. Therefore, in example (3) the complement proposition is not
presupposed as true. This is a case of type B, where factivity is lost when the main
clause is negated.
As seen in (2) and (3), with the same negative structure you don’t know that
+PROPOSITION, the two distinctively different interpretations are possible: type
A with the complement proposition being presupposed as true; type B with the
complement proposition not being presupposed as true. The objective of this paper
is to elucidate such semantic difference in the interpretation between type A and
type B. The difference seems to be closely related to the cognitive interaction of
the ground, the speaker and the hearer, who read each other’s knowledge,
viewpoints and intention. Thus it is both relevant and essential to analyze the
examples in relation to the context of the discourse between the speaker and the
hearer. The discussion of the present paper is made based on the models proposed
by Ronald W. Langacker: the control cycle (2009) and the current discourse space
(2008).
In the following section, we will look at Langacker’s model of the control
cycle, in which the semantic structure of the cognitive verb know will be
designated. Next, we will see Langacker’s scheme of the current discourse space.
Then, the hypotheses of this paper will be introduced and the hypotheses will be
examined.
??????? ????? ??? ??? ???? ????
This section introduces Langacker’s model of the control cycle, in which the
semantic structure of the cognitive verb know is designated. Langacker proposes a
general cognitive model, the control cycle, which he applies to various aspects of
human experience (2002, 2009). One aspect, the epistemic level, which pertains to
the acquisition of propositional knowledge, is the main concern of the present
paper. Before we look at the epistemic level, however, first, let us look at the
general model which was proposed by Langacker. The model is sketched as in Fig.
1 below.
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(Langacker 2009: p. 130)
First, in the static baseline, an actor (A) controls the entities, which are illustrated
as small circles, and they constitute its dominion (D). Next in the potential phase,
some target (T) enters into the field (F) and the actor needs to deal with the target,
which causes tension there. In the phase of action, the actor exercises some sort of
force, indicated with double arrows, bringing the target (T) into the actor’s own
dominion. As a result the target is under the control of the actor, the stasis being
brought again.
Langacker maintains that the control cycle can be applied to events at
different levels, such as the physical, perceptual, mental and social. For example,
at the physical level, the control cycle can indicate how a cat encounters a mouse,
catching and putting it under its control. In case of the epistemic level, it will be
shown how propositional knowledge is acquired by the conceptualizer. Such a
process is illustrated in Fig. 2 below.
(Langacker 2009: p. 133)
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As shown in Fig. 2, the actor is a conceptualizer (C); the target is a proposition
(P); and the dominion is the conceptualizer’s view of reality (epistemic dominion),
that is, the set of propositions that the conceptualizer currently assumes to be valid.
First, in the formulation phase, P exists in C’s field of awareness. At this phase C
is only aware of the propositional knowledge but has not yet assessed its validity.
Next, in the inclination phase, through assessment, C arrives at some sort of
inclination regarding to P, which is represented by the dashed arrow. Langacker
points out that depending on degrees of force, P could be either accepted as “part
of C’s view of reality” or rejected as in the case of the verb doubt , for example
(2009: p. 133). Finally, in the result phase, P is possessed as C’s view of reality in
its dominion.
Based on their semantic values, predicates can be characterized in terms of
how the profiled relationship maps onto the control cycle. Langacker proposes five
types in cognitive verbs, depending on the phase each cognitive verb maps onto.
The five types, that is, result, action, formulation, assessment and inclination, are
illustrated in Fig. 3. Verbs corresponding to each type are listed accordingly in (4).
(Langacker 2009: p. 132)
(4)
a. Result: He {knows / believes / thinks / realizes / accepts / is sure / is certain /
is convinced} that Bush is a pacifist.
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b. Action: She {learned / discovered / decided / concluded / realized /
determined / found out / figured out} that his whole story was a pack of lies.
c. Formulation: It is {possible / conceivable / plausible / feasible / imaginable}
that they could be of some use to us.
d. Assessment: He {wondered / considered / asked / was unsure / was
undecided / was unclear} whether the effort was worth the bother.
e. Inclination: I {suspect / believe / suppose / think / figure / reckon} they will
never agree to my offer. (Langacker 2009: p. 132)
As shown above, in the case of the verb know, the profiled relationship maps onto
the result phase, where the proposition is possessed as the conceptualizer’s view of
reality in his/her dominion. This paper takes this theory of Langacker’s as its
standpoint, applying the definition of the verb know to the discussion.
In this section, Langacker’s model of the control cycle is introduced and it is
shown how the semantic value of the verb know is designated. That is, the verb
know refers to the result phase: the proposition is possessed as the conceptualizer’s
view of reality in its dominion. This definition of the verb know will be the basis
of the following discussion.
??????? ????????? ?????
The previous section introduced the control cycle, in which the semantic
value of the verb know is designated. That is, the verb know refers to the result
phase: the proposition is possessed as the conceptualizer’s view of reality in its
dominion. In this section, Langacker’s model, the current discourse space (CDS),
is presented. In the introduction, it is pointed out that the two types of negative
structure, type A and type B, differ from each other in relation to how the speaker
and hearer read each other’s knowledge, viewpoint and the intention of their
utterances. Put differently, such cognitive interaction between the speaker and the
hearer of the ground plays an essential part in understanding the difference
between the two types. Thus the present paper applies Langacker’s model, the
current discourse space, which gives full explanation of “how interlocutors arrive
at roughly similar conceptions of the objective content (Langacker 2008: p. 466).
In discourse, the speaker and hearer engage in assessing each other’s
knowledge and intentions, which is the key factor of the linguistic meaning of an
expression. In other words, interpretation of an expression is impossible without
the common ground provided by the overall context, which is shared by the
interlocutors (Langacker 2008, p. 465). Langacker calls this common basis for
interpretation the current discourse space (CDS).
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As discourse unfolds, at each step the current expression is constructed
and interpreted against the background of those that have gone before.
The prior discourse is a major determinant (along with context,
background knowledge, etc.) of what I call current discourse space
(CDS). The CDS is a mental space comprising everything presumed to
be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for discourse at a given
moment. Starting from that basis, each successive utterance updates the
CDS in some fashion. (Langacker 2008: p. 59)
The scheme of CDS is illustrated in Fig. 4 as below.
(Langacker 2008: p. 466)
As shown above, first in Previous Usage Event, the speaker and the hearer
(Ground) access each other’s knowledge and intention, based on which they
pursue utterance in Current Usage Event. The event that the speaker anticipates is
illustrated in Anticipated Usage Event.3 Based on this scheme, the next section will
3 Furthermore, introducing the CDS, Langacker points out that in negation the positive
conception of what is being negated will be brought into mind (p. 2008: p. 59). He illustrates
this point through the following dialogue.
A: Will Victoria agree to be a candidate?
B: She may not.
C: But Stephanie will. (Langacker 2008: p. 59)
Here, the speaker B’s use of “not” is understood as corresponding to the positive notion, that is,
Victoria’s agreeing, which was brought in prior to B’s utterance. In other words, the speaker B
would have no reason to have a negative utterance using “not” unless the possibility of
Victoria’s agreeing to be a candidate had been mentioned for consideration.
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propose the hypotheses of this paper.
??????????
In this section, the hypotheses of this paper will be proposed based on
Langacker’s model of the control cycle and the current discourse space. The
hypotheses are based on the following premises:
Premise 1. Type A is a case where the subordinate-clause proposition is kept
presupposed even though the main clause is negated. Thus, with type A,
S possesses P as his/her view of reality.
Premise 2. Type B is a case where the subordinate-clause proposition is not
presupposed. Thus, with type B, S does not possess P as his/her view
of reality.
Hypotheses
Type A
Previous Usage Event:
A-1 S thinks that H does not possess P as his/her view of reality.
Anticipated Usage Event:
A-2 H will realize that he/she does not possess P as his/her view of reality.
Type B
Previous Usage Event:
B-1 S thinks that H possesses P as his/her view of reality.
Anticipated Usage Event:
B-2 H will reassess the validity of P.
[S: Speaker, H: Hearer, P: Complement proposition]
This section presented the hypotheses of the paper. In the next section, the
validity of the hypotheses will be analyzed. We will examine if the hypotheses for
the two types can be applied to the examples of the corresponding types. If they
are applicable, the hypotheses are regarded as valid and cogent.
??????????? ????? ?? ??? ??????????
This section examines the validity of the hypotheses proposed in the previous
section. We will analyze if the hypotheses are applicable to examples of both type
A and type B.
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First, let us look at examples (5), (6) and (7), which belong to type A.
(5)
“Sleepiness affects the part of the brain responsible for judgment and self-
awareness,” says Dr. Balkin and as awareness drifts away, we do not, obviously,
realize this is happening. “If you’re driving, you may know you feel tired, but you
do not know that you are falling asleep,” he says. “It’s completely insidious”. You
can also fall asleep very briefly and wake up without even being aware that you
nodded off. These “microsleeps” may last for just a few seconds... enough time for
something awful to happen if you’re behind the wheel of a fast-moving 2-ton
vehicle.
(http://www.prevention.com/health/health-concerns/danger-driving-tired)
In (5) Dr. Balkin is talking about the possible danger that drivers might fall asleep
“without knowing it.” Here, the speaker, Dr. Balkin, possesses the proposition you
are falling asleep while driving as his view of reality, and therefore, this is a case
of type A. Now let us see if the hypotheses of this paper are applicable to this
example. According to the hypothesis A-1, S thinks that H does not possess P as
his/her view of reality. This hypothesis is relevant to the case here, because here
Dr. Balkin (= S) is warning the danger (=P) that drivers (= H) don’t realize the fact
that they’re falling asleep. Also, the doctor describes the situation as insidious.
Obviously, he thinks that the drivers (= H) do not possess P (=drivers are falling
asleep) as their view of reality. Furthermore, as for Anticipated Usage Event, the
hypothesis A-2 H will realize that he does not possess P as his/her view of reality
is also applicable to this case. This is because Dr. Balkin’s (the speaker’s) intention
of his utterance is to have drivers (=H) realize their ignorance and to warn them
the danger of falling asleep. Thus the hypotheses are applicable here, and therefore
they are regarded as valid.
(6)
Mirriam sat heavily on a sack of potatoes and scowled around her, acting for her
potential audience. “You’re being a selfish girl. A vicious selfish girl to make us all
search this way.” The fluted girl nodded. Yes, I am a selfish girl, she thought. I am
a selfish girl, and you are a woman, and yet we are the same age, and I am smarter
than you. You are clever but you don’t know that hidey-holes are best when they
are in places no one looks. You look for me under and behind and between, but
you don’t look up. I am above you, and I am watching you, just as Stephen
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watched us all. Mirriam grimaced and got up. “No matter. Burson will find you.”
She brushed the dust from her skirts. “You hear me? Burson will find you.” She
left the pantry. (The Fluted Girl )
(6) above is another case of Type A, where the subordinate-clause proposition is
presupposed to be true. The fluted girl is claiming how clever she is to find such a
perfect place to hide herself safely. Now, let us see if the hypotheses for type A
are applicable to this case, too. First, according to the hypothesis A-1, S thinks that
H does not possess P as his/her view of reality. This hypothesis is applicable here
because the fluted girl (=S) thinks that Mirriam (=H) does not imagine that she
would be hiding in a safe place. In addition, according to the hypothesis A-2, H
will realize that he/she does not possess P as his/her view of reality. By saying
“you don’t know that hidey-holes are best when they are in places no one looks,”
the fluted girl (=S) is trying to make Mirriam (=H) recognize her ignorance and to
feel superior to Mirriam. Of course this is the heroine’s monolog, and Mirriam is
not actually listening to her. Nevertheless, the intention of the girl’s utterance
won’t change. Thus both hypotheses are regarded as relevant.
As the last example of type A, let us look at (7), which we saw in the
introduction.
(7)
TEICHNER: (Voiceover) When the Revolutionary War ended, General George
Washington came home to Mt. Vernon uncomfortable with anything having
to do with slavery. So he hid his new slave quarters in plain sight, next to his
greenhouse.
Mr. WIENCEK: That’s the great genius of Washington the architect. You don’t
know that those are the slave quarters. There are no doors, there are very
small windows. He made it invisible. I mean, this is kind of a symbol of his
struggle with slavery, architecturally, right here in front of us. ( = (2))
Here, in You don’t know that those are the slave quarters, the subject you is
regarded as a generic reference.4 It refers to the potential audience in general,
including Teichner, one of the other current interlocutors. Still, the hypotheses for
type A are relevant to this case. First, according to the hypothesis A-1, S thinks
that H does not possess P as his/her view of reality. The hypothesis is applicable
here, because Mr. Wiencek (=S) says, “he made it invisible,” which means that
4 The example (5) can be also regarded as a case where a generic you is used.
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people in general (=H) wouldn’t notice the houses are for slaves. Moreover, the
hypothesis A-2 is pertinent here. That is, the intention of Mr. Wiencek’s utterance
is to inform the potential audience that they wouldn’t notice the fact, that is, the
houses are built for slaves. In this way Mr. Wiencek is trying to show how skillful
Washington was when he built the houses, as well as how uncomfortable
Washington felt with slavery in those days. Thus, the hypotheses are relevant in
the case of (7).
?? ???? ?
Next, let us look at the cases that belong to type B and examine if the
hypotheses of this paper can be applied to them.
(8)
Dr. ROSENBERG: ...atropine, scopolamine, thorazine and Vitamin B. They work
by providing an antagonist to the nicotine craving.
STOSSEL: And that gives you an 80... 90 percent success rate?
Dr. ROSENBERG: For two months. It’s an 80, 90 percent success rate for two
months. It’s a 40....
STOSSEL: But what is it for... oh, 40?
Dr. ROSENBERG: Forty percent for 12 months.
STOSSEL: But aren’t you conning people, desperate people, a little bit here? I
mean, “80 percent success rate, pay $500”? You don’t know that your patients
are doing that well.
Dr. ROSENBERG: Just in the time that I’ve been here, I’ve been very, very
impressed with the length of stay that they have been off cigarettes.
STOSSEL: Can we go through your records and do our own survey and see if it’s
true?
Dr. ROSENBERG: Sure. Be my guest.
STOSSEL: Okay, let’s go do that. (voice-over) We’ll give you the results of that
survey in a moment, but first, one more approach...
(ABC , 1990/05/25)
Here, Dr. Rosenberg is telling how effective his treatment has been for the patients
who want to quit smoking. On the other hand, Stossel, a reporter, is skeptical
about the alleged effectiveness of the treatment. Example (8) is a case of type B,
where the complement proposition, your patients are doing that well , is not
presupposed as a fact. As a matter of fact, the speaker, Stossel, is saying that Dr.
Rosenberg’s claim is not quite reliable. Now, let us see if the hypotheses for type
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B are applicable to this example. First, according to the hypothesis B-1, the
speaker thinks that the hearer possesses the proposition as his/her view of reality.
Without doubt, in example (8), Stossel (=S) thinks that Dr. Rosenberg (=H)
believes in the effectiveness of his/her therapy. Next, let’s consider the Anticipated
Usage Event. According to the hypothesis B-2, H will reassess the validity of P . In
fact, here S (=Stossel) is anticipating that H (= Dr.Rosenberg) will reconsider the
effect of the treatment. However, the doctor doesn’t seem to care about Stossel’s
intention here. Seeing that, Stossel says that they want to examine Rosenberg’s
record and do their own survey to see if the treatment is truly effective. As seen
above, both the hypothesis B-1 and B-2 are applicable to this case.
(9)
A: There’s no ceiling on that violin. It could be worth a fortune. That’s not
including the stones. I wish there was some way to contact one of those
collectors that have all the money in the world.
B: Too bad I don’t know any. And, besides, you don’t know that those diamonds
are real. They could be glass.
He enjoyed saying that. He didn’t care if they were real or not.
A: Maybe, but that violin is old; they bought it in Portugal on one of their visits. I
phoned the woman. She doesn’t know how much money her husband paid for
it. (COCA)
In regard to the hypothesis B-1, the speaker (=B) assumes that the hearer (=A)
regards the stones as real diamonds. However, the speaker him/herself is not sure
if they are real, suggesting the possibility that they could be only glass. Moreover,
regarding to the hypothesis B-2, the hearer (=A) is actually reassessing the validity
of the proposition here. The hearer A says, “Maybe,” which shows that he is
reevaluating the proposition that those diamonds are real .
(10)
ARLENE: Reuben’s real upset, honey. He got hurt. No matter what I said to him,
he wouldn’t take me back now. No way. You didn’t see him this morning, honey.
He’s real upset. He ain’t never gonna forgive me.
TREVOR: You don’t know that he wouldn’t.
ARLENE: I know.
TREVOR: You don’t know until you ask him.
(Pay It Forward )
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(10) is a conversation between Arlene, the mother, and Trevor, her son. The
mother is worried that Reuben is so upset that he won’t forgive her. First,
according to the hypothesis B-1, S thinks that H possesses P as his/her view of
reality. Here, S (=Trevor) thinks that H (=Arlene) believes that Reuben won’t
forgive her. Therefore, the hypothesis B-1 is relevant. The hypothesis B-2, H will
reassess the validity of P , is also applicable here. In (10) Trevor (=S) is trying to
change his mother’s idea, saying “you don’t know that.” Nevertheless, Arlene (=
H) sticks to her pessimistic idea and says, “I know.” Hearing that, Trevor suggests
that she should ask Reuben how he really feels.
In this section we examined if the hypotheses are applicable to the examples
of the two types, and it was shown that the hypotheses for each type are applicable.
Therefore we regard the hypotheses of the present paper as relevant and valid.
??? ??????????
This paper examined the negative sentence you don’t know that +
PROPOSITION with two different meanings: type A with factivity and type B
without factivity. Based on Langacker’s models, that is, the control cycle and the
current discourse space, the present paper proposed the hypotheses. First, with
type A, S thinks that H does not posses P as his/her view of reality (A-1); H will
realize that he/she does not possess P as his/her view of reality (A-2). Second,
with type B, S thinks that H possesses P as his/her view of reality (B-1); H will
reassess the validity of P (B-2). The examples for each type were examined in the
light of the hypotheses: it was shown that the hypotheses are relevant in all cases.
Thus the paper concludes that the hypotheses are valid.
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Bacigalupi, Paolo. (2003). The Fluted Girl , Audio Text Inc.
Davies, M. (2008-). The Corpus of Contemporary American English: 450 million words, 1990-
present. URL: http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/.
Hyde, Catherine Ryan. (1999). Pay It Forward. Simon & Schuster.
Kiparsky, Paul, and Kiparsky, Carol. (1970). Fact. In Manfred Bierwisch and Karl Erich
Heidolph (eds.), Progress in Linguistics: 143-173. The Hague: Mouton.
Langacker, Ronald W. (1987). Foundation of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 1, Theoretical
Prerequisites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. (2002). The Control Cycle: Why Grammar is a Matter of Life and Death.
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Japanese Cognitive Linguistics Association 2:
193-220.
Langacker, Ronald W. (2008). Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction . New York: Oxford
67
University Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. (2009). Investigations in Cognitive Grammar . Berlin: Mouton de
Gruyter.
Nakamura, Yoshihisa. (2010). Hitei to kanshukansei: Ninchi bunpou ni okeru hitei. In Yasuhiko
Kato, Akiko Yoshimura and Ikumi Imani ed. Hitei to Gengo Riron. Tokyo: Kaitaku sha.
Nakashima, Chiharu. (2015a). Complement Clause with the Verb Know: You as “Object of
Conceptualization” or “Subject of Conceptualization”? Fukuoka Jo Gakuin University
Bulletin, Faculty of International Career Development, Vol.1: 1-16.
Nakashima, Chiharu. (2015b). Analyzing Complement Clauses with the Verb Know from an
Intersubjective View. Kyushu University Paper in Linguistics, Vol.35.
Nakashima, Chiharu. (2015c). Analyzing Complement Clauses with the Verb Know from an
Intersubjective View. Paper presented at the 13th International Cognitive Linguistics
Conference (ICLC), New Castle, UK.
Verhagen, Arie. (2005). Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax, and Cognition.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Verhagen, Arie. (2007). Construal and Perspectivization. In Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert
Cuychens ed. The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
68
